










University of Greenwich, UK
David Hall
University of Greenwich, UK
Abstract
Investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms were intended to protect companies from
the Global North against expropriation by Global South countries. Since 2000, investor–
state dispute settlement mechanisms have increasingly been used against Northern coun-
tries to obtain compensation for and constrain policy decisions around nationalisation and
remunicipalisation, as well as around the environmental or social regulation of service
provision that threatens commercial interests. Social movements and governments alike
resisted investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms, and despite the power wielded by
multinational companies, the global trend is now to exclude investor–state dispute settle-
ment mechanisms from new investment treaties. The purpose of this article is to provide a
political-economy analysis of the processes of supporting and contesting the role of inves-
tor–state dispute settlement mechanisms in international treaties, processes that include
activity at national, sub-national and international levels. The ensuing conflicts are analysed
in terms of post-colonial contradictions over sovereignty under globalisation, continued
contestation over the role of the public sector and climate change policies.
Points for practitioners
The probability of investor success with investor–state dispute settlement mechanism
claims should not be overestimated, and investor assessments of the basis and
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prospects for such cases should be subject to critical scrutiny. Governments should be
aware of widespread popular antagonism towards investor–state dispute settlement
mechanisms and global trends to remove such clauses from agreements. They should
also review all bilateral investment treaties, free trade agreements and the Energy
Charter Treaty that the country has ratified to assess the potential relative advantages
of retention or leaving.
Keywords
bilateral investment treaties, compensation, Energy Charter Treaty, environmental reg-
ulations, globalisation, investor–state dispute settlement mechanism, municipalisation,
nationalisation, populism
Introduction
The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses of international investment
and trade treaties allow international investors to sue states and local governments
before an international arbitration tribunal. Originally expected to protect foreign
investors against expropriation by countries of the Global South, since the millen-
nium, they have also been increasingly used in countries of the Global North to
prevent nationalisation or remunicipalisation (the reversal of privatisation on the
municipal level), as well as to obstruct changes to the environmental or social
regulation of service provision that threaten commercial interests.
Since the 1980s, privatisation has been a dominant global policy, favouring
investors. While privatisation is still increasing worldwide (Weghmann, 2020),
since the millennium, there has been a counter-tendency towards public ownership:
more than 1400 cases of remunicipalisation or nationalisation involving more than
2400 cities in 58 countries have been identified since the year 2000 (Kishimoto
et al., 2020). Yet, these figures are likely to be an understatement, as most remu-
nicipalisations are not publicly recorded and are therefore unknown. Even in the
UK, a country famous for its excessive privatisations, at least 222 local govern-
ment contracts were remunicipalised between 2016 and 2018 (APSE, 2019); fur-
thermore, nationalisation proposals proved to be very popular with voters in the
2019 UK election (Hall, 2020). In this context, investors have been using ISDS
claims not only to seek compensation for the ending of concession agreements or
for nationalisations, but also as a financial deterrent to prevent such policies. Local
governments are particularly vulnerable, as they cannot necessarily rely on the
backing of their national government, especially when there are political differ-
ences between the local and the national levels. For example, in 2017 in Sheffield,
UK, the council voted for an early end to the city’s 35-year waste management
contract with Veolia, which had started in 2001, because it was no longer perceived
to meet the city’s waste management needs. However, after Veolia threated an
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ISDS claim for compensation, the decision to remunicipalise the service was
revoked (Weghmann, 2020).
ISDS claims have been used not only to deter the termination of privatisations,
but also: to challenge public health regulations, for example, as in Phillip Morris v
Australia with regards to enacting tobacco packaging regulations that required a
graphic health warning; to claim compensation for renewable energy policies, for
example, in Spain, Italy and Germany; and to challenge changes in labour laws on
wages, for example, as in Veolia v Egypt, where the French firm sued Egypt over
an increase in its minimum wage (Klett, 2016), and the Italian mining investors
who sued South Africa for compensation over its black empowerment policies
introduced to redress some of the injustices of apartheid in South Africa
(Burianski and Parise Kuhnle, 2018). The fact that ISDS mechanisms have enabled
foreign investors to privately challenge the legislation, regulations and judicial or
administrative rulings of host states has meant that international arbitration tri-
bunals have created a ‘regulatory chill’, meaning the prevention of regulatory
protections and policies for fear that an investor could take states to arbitration
(Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018; Kynast, 2019). In the COVID-19 pandemic, com-
panies could use ISDS to claim compensation from governments for measures
taken to protect the country from COVID-19, regardless of national laws permit-
ting such public interest policies (CEO, 2020). Hence, attorneys warn that the fact
that investors might take advantage of the pandemic by invoking ISDS lawsuits
constitutes ‘profound threats to the public as well as socio-economic health at a
national and global scale’ (Schmidt, 2020).
To date, academic discussion around ISDS arbitrations, as well as the policy
discussions of civil society organisations, have been quick to point to the power
given by ISDS mechanisms to multinational corporations to weaken the state’s
capacity to protect the public interest (Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018; Eberhardt
et al., 2018; Johnson et al., 2015). This is in line with a broader strand of critical
scholarship that focuses on the power of elite agencies, overemphasises the coher-
ence of neoliberalism and downplays the agency of those who resist its logic
(Morton, 2007). However, these treaties and their ISDS clauses have, in turn,
been subjected to powerful public campaigns and increasing resistance by national
governments in both the Global South and the Global North, with some treaties
being terminated, including the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and new treaties exclude ISDS clauses. This is not simply a matter of
the technical interpretation of specific treaties in specific cases or mapping the
extent to which international laws constrain the public administrative laws of
nation states. Rather, it is a highly contested international political process over
the political legitimacy and primacy of these legal structures themselves, which
involves not only political action by business interests, but also a strong political
resistance to the role of such international commercial law (Cutler, 2003, 2016).
The political successes of this resistance poses questions: how is it that some
individual cases have been successfully frustrated by this resistance? How has this
resistance been able to remove ISDS clauses from key international agreements?
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This article challenges the predominant literature around ISDS disputes by noting
that the outcomes of contestations over ISDS are not predetermined by the treaties
or even the power of multinational companies, but have also been continually
shaped by public resistance, the emergence of new political forces and the changing
orientation of national governments towards globalisation. This article argues that
while ISDS mechanisms have, indeed, provided a powerful tool for multinational
companies to claim compensation for lost profits when public services are nation-
alised/remunicipalised or regulated, they do not operate in a vacuum, but are
influenced by post-colonial contradictions over sovereignty under globalisation,
by continued political contestation over the resurgent role of the public and by
more general factors, such as the rise of nationalist populism and the COVID-19
pandemic.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section sets out data on the use of
ISDS mechanisms. It then shows the striking asymmetry of cases between coun-
tries and locates this in the previous history of international trade law. The fourth
section engages with the opposition to ISDS mechanisms by social movements and
governments at national and international levels in both the Global South and the
Global North. Subsequently, the article concludes with a discussion on the neo-
colonial contradictions and the rise of new protectionism that shape ISDS lawsuits
and the way they can and are likely to be used by investors to demand compen-
sation for nationalisations.
ISDS mechanisms and the use of international arbitration over
compensation
International treaties that provide mechanisms for ISDS include bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) between two countries, multilateral investment treaties – of
which the most relevant is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) – and free trade
agreements (FTAs), covering a particular region or trade between two or more
states or groups of states. The ISDS clauses typically enable companies to take
claims for compensation against states over expropriation or other actions dimin-
ishing expected returns to either the World Bank’s arbitration tribunal (the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)) (where
over half of investor–state disputes are filed), the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), the London Court of Arbitration or the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (Klett, 2016).
To date, over 3000 investment treaties have been signed across the world. These
treaties overlap so that multinational companies can ‘shop’ around for treaties in
countries where they have subsidiaries, and also choose from multiple arbitration
venues offered by treaties (Peinhardt and Wellhausen, 2016). From the late 1950s
(when this system was first established) to 2000, only 50 cases were filed. This
increased dramatically from the turn of the millennium onwards, with 500 cases
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being recorded between 2000 and 2014 (Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018). As of July
2019, the total number of publicly known ISDS claims had reached 983 (United
Nations Conference of Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2019).
Multinational companies have been relatively successful in claiming compensa-
tion through ISDS proceedings. Out of the 983 claims, almost 36% were decided in
favour of the state, almost 30% were decided in favour of the investor and almost
22% were settled, while over 11% were discontinued and 2% were decided in
favour of neither party (UNCTAD, 2019) (see Supplementary Online Figure 1,
available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/ras). In the settled cases, it can be
assumed that some sort of compensation has been paid; hence, the number of cases
that benefit foreign investors is clearly in the majority (Ciocchini and Khoury,
2018).
In recent years, increased concerns around the fairness of the ISDS procedures
have been voiced. This legal system is purposely designed in a manner that lacks
transparency. There is only limited information available of how the investor–state
arbitration system works, as there is no systemwide disclosure (OECD, 2018). The
nature of ISDS is ad hoc, with arbitrators being appointed on a case-by-case basis.
Each case is decided by three judges. The investor and the host state may each
appoint one arbitrator and those arbitrators usually appoint a third arbitrator
(Kynast, 2019). The impartiality of these judges has been questioned because
roles frequently overlap, as the same individual judges can act as lawyers – in
other words, prepare investors’ claims – in other ISDS cases, with a potential
conflict of interests. Most ISDS arbitrators are commercial arbitrators, men,
people from the upper reaches of the top 1% of incomes and individuals from
the Global North (Gaukrodger, 2017; Klett, 2016; OECD, 2018). Hence, it has
been argued ‘that ISDS presents fundamental contradictions to the rule of law; it
has a business bias and a lack of transparency and accountability in its arbitration
procedures which is anything but impartial’ (Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018).
Historical asymmetries and the unexpected turn
Although the ISDS mechanism is formally symmetrical, creating the same dispute
mechanism for private parties regardless of their nationalities, in practice, the
asymmetry is huge. ISDS cases have overwhelmingly been brought by companies
from the Global North against Global South countries (see Supplementary Online
Table 1, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/ras). Whereas investors
from the European Union (EU15), US and Canada have initiated over 600 cases,
they have been the target of only 109 claims. The great four European imperial
countries – France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – have together initi-
ated nearly 300 cases yet been the subject of only five. Nearly half of cases target-
ing Global North countries were brought by investors from the US and Canada
against each other under NAFTA, and the great majority of the claims against
Spain and Italy under the ECT have also been brought by investors based in other
EU15 countries. In total, there have been only 11 cases against the EU15, US and
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Canada brought by investors from other countries – none of which have been
successful.
This asymmetry can only be understood in the historical context of economic
relations between investors from Western Europe and North America, and the
countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. In this perspective,
BITs and similar agreements can be seen as the latest historical stage of a series of
protection mechanisms for investors, and so were always expected to be used by
investors of the Global North against countries of the Global South (Miles, 2014;
Patel, 2017; Wellhausen, 2016). Up to the mid-20th century, empires were the
simplest method for providing this protection but other mechanisms were used
to avoid European or North American investors being subject to the rule of law in
countries outside empires. These included the ‘capitulations’ agreed by the
Ottoman Empire from the 17th century onwards, which exempted European trad-
ers from being subject to rulings of Ottoman courts, and ‘gunboat diplomacy’,
whereby countries were threatened with naval attacks unless the claims of investors
were met, as happened with Egypt, Venezuela and other countries in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries (Ahmad, 2000).
The forerunner of ISDS is the system of international law developed in the 19th
century, originally to protect US and European investors in the newly independent
Latin American countries, which was conceptualised as a universal law superior to
the supposedly unreliable and ‘politicised’ legal systems of non-Western countries:
‘only an international setting could be relied upon to apply universal rules and
ensure a neutral, depoliticised, and fair hearing for a foreign investor’ (Miles, 2014:
1006). However, already in the 19th century, the legitimacy of this regime was
challenged by Latin American countries, who instead advanced the Calvo doctrine,
which states simply: ‘Aliens should be afforded no more than the same treatment
as nationals, and must limit themselves to filing claims in the local judicial system’
(Miles, 2014: 1000). This doctrine and its assertion of national sovereignty has
continued to form the core argument in subsequent political contestations over
the system.
BITs and ISDS mechanisms were developed in the 1950s–1970s to provide
continued protection for investors within the geopolitical context of decolonialisa-
tion, as many newly independent states nationalised their resources and introduced
protectionist measures as part of their economic strategies (Friedan, 2006;
Rodriguez Goyes and South, 2017). It was again argued that ISDS was a necessary
replacement for dysfunctional domestic courts in countries with a weak rule-of-law
tradition and therefore a tool to combat corruption (Schill, 2015; Schultz and
Dupont, 2014). Further BITs were created in the 1980s and 1990s to protect
investors in East European countries in transition from communism. The multi-
lateral ECT, covering over 50 countries, was similarly created to protect European
investors in the energy sector in Russia in 1998 – signed just weeks before the
negotiations for the Multinational Agreement on Investment (MAI) collapsed, at
least in part, due to the global public resistance against it (Varney and Martin,
2000). The first ISDS lawsuits under the ECT also mostly hit countries in Central
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Asia and Eastern Europe, as intended and expected – though Russia, the original
target of the agreement, refused to ratify it. From about 2013, companies began
exploiting the formal symmetry of the ECT to make ISDS claims against Western
European states, especially against renewable energy schemes. These initially chal-
lenged the Southern member states, such as Spain and Italy, but cases were then
also brought against Germany (Eberhardt et al., 2018).
ISDS must therefore be seen as a post-colonial mechanism institutionalising and
continuing the asymmetrical global power relations developed in the colonial
period (Ciocchini and Khoury, 2018; Friedan, 2006). This explains why ISDS
cases brought against EU countries from about 2010 created great political con-
sternation. Until then, ‘it was deemed somewhat inconceivable that international
investment treaties could be deployed against the very states that championed
them’ (Sattorova, 2016: 57). The mechanism was intended to be used by investors
from these West European countries, not by other investors against them.
The volume of ISDS cases has been rising to an unprecedented extent since just
before the millennium (see Supplementary Online Figure 2, available at: https://
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras). Many of the cases were brought against Global
South countries but an increasing number were brought against EU member states
– initially, the Central and East European countries that had joined more recently
but then also against West European countries, including Germany. Two such
cases, based on intra-EU BITs, claimed compensation for healthcare policy
changes by EU member states. In one of them, the Achmea case, a company
used a Netherlands–Slovakia BIT to claim compensation from Slovakia for chang-
ing the regulation of health insurers. The arbitration tribunal awarded compensa-
tion to Achmea but Slovakia referred the judgment to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), which ruled in March 2018 that the arbitration agree-
ment in article 8 of the BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal
order and so is incompatible with EU law (ECJ, 2018).
There was also a major surge in cases brought under the ECT: only 19 cases
were brought in the first 10 years up to 2008 but 75 investor lawsuits were filed
between 2013 and 2017. Cases are now being targeted at Western European coun-
tries, principally Spain and Italy, with large claims: 16 cases involved claims of
over US$1 billion. The formal symmetry of the treaties was now being exploited
against the countries that had created the system, weakening their own
sovereignty.
Global South contestation over ISDS mechanisms
This millennial surge in ISDS cases has driven and widened political activity over
the ISDS system. This is not simply the contestation of individual cases, but a
series of political actions about the legitimacy and functioning of the system itself.
Usually, resistance by national and international social movements to ISDS fol-
lowed on from other struggles, most notably, resistance to the introduction of
privatisations under conditionalities set by the World Bank and the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF). Successful termination of privatisations trig-
gered ISDS claims by multinational companies to claim compensation and deter
nationalisations.
In particular, conflicts over water privatisation in the 1990s and 2000s involved
widespread national and local campaigns by social movements, with active support
from international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and networks.
Contrary to the expectations and objectives of the multinational companies,
these campaigns successfully achieved the termination of many private concessions
and contracts (Brennan et al., 2007). When some of the companies concerned used
ISDS to claim compensation, the political process continued and challenged ISDS
lawsuits – and, again, the companies did not always win.
For example, in Cochabamba, Bolivia, a broad social movement succeeded in
ending water privatisation in March 2000, a victory that rapidly became interna-
tionally famous. Under the terms of a US$138 million IMF loan for Bolivia, a 40-
year concession agreement for Cochabamba’s water supply was awarded to a
consortium of the US company Bechtel and the Spanish company Abengoa – a
contract made in secret, with only one bidder. Within weeks, water prices were
raised by over 50%, leading to a wave of protests by the Coordinadora de Defensa
del Agua y de la Vida (‘Coalition for the Defence of Water and Life’), a broad
alliance of farmers, factory workers, rural and urban water committees, neighbour-
hood organisations, students, and middle-class professionals against water priva-
tisation. The uprising, which became known as the Cochabamba water war, lasted
for several months. Protests erupted not only in Cochabamba, but in the entire
country, including strikes, roadblocks, the closing of airports and crowding the
central plaza (Norris and Metzidakis 2010). At first, the resistance was met by
brutal state repression. Eventually, after continuous and escalating protests that
led the government to declare a state of emergency, as well as the refusal of
residents to pay their water bills, the government had no choice but to give in
and finally terminated the contract with the private provider nearly five months
after it took effect (Lobina, 2000; Norris and Metzidakis, 2010). Subsequently,
Bechtel and Abengoa filed a US$25 million ISDS compensation claim to recover
its costs and obtain damages for loss of expected profits. This gave rise to an
international campaign that not only challenged the nature of ISDS by demanding
transparency of the arbitration proceedings, but also damaged Bechtel’s reputation
considerably (Norris and Metzidakis, 2010). Eventually, the companies gave up
and settled for a token payment of 2 bolivianos (around US$0.25 at the time) to
avoid reputational damage. This was the first time that global public pressure had
forced a large multinational corporation to drop a case before the ICSID (Shultz,
2009). However, by the time the ICSID dispute was settled, the Bolivian govern-
ment had spent US$1.6 million in legal fees for its defence (Norris and Metzidakis,
2010).
Similarly, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, water services were privatised in 2003 as
part of an IMF and World Bank condition for debt relief. A consortium of the
German company Gauff, the British company Biwater and the Tanzanian
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company Superdoll won a 10-year contract for delivering water and sewage serv-
ices in Dar es Salaam. Like in Bolivia, the privatisation process was very secretive,
with not even the Tanzanian Parliament being able to see the contract. Soon after
the privatisation, problems increased: leakage increased, billing errors occurred,
investment targets were not met, employees were badly paid and corruption
increased. Due to the failure of the private companies, the Tanzanian government
nationalised the service in 2005. Consequently, Biwater used the UK–Tanzania
BIT to make a claim to ICSID for compensation of over US$20 million from the
Tanzanian government. The Tanzanian government vigorously resisted the claim
and, in the end, the ICSID tribunal refused to grant compensation (Italaw, 2008).
Biwater fared even worse in its claim before UNCITRAL for damages, as the
tribunal supported Tanzania’s counterclaim and ordered the company to pay
US$3 million compensation for underperformance – which the company avoided
by declaring itself bankrupt (International Institutes for Sustainable Development
[IISD], 2018a; Pigeon, 2012).
Resistance of Global South states against ISDS claims are as old as the mech-
anism itself. Yet, there has been increased political efforts to counter the increase
of ISDS claims since 2000. A number of countries in the Global South started
terminating, renegotiating or rejecting BITs altogether, including Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, India, Indonesia and South Africa (Peinhardt and Wellhausen, 2016;
Sattorova, 2016). Brazil refused to sign BITs at all and has proposed alternatives
involving mediation, possibly backed by state–state dispute settlement processes
instead of ISDS (Puig, 2018). India sought to renegotiate all of its 83 BITs to allow
protection of sovereignty, and finally terminated 58 BITs (Patel, 2017). The fore-
going discussion demonstrates that: (1) individual ISDS cases can and have been
won by countries of the Global South; and (2) due to negative experiences with
ISDS, several countries in the Global South are abandoning ISDS altogether (see
Supplementary Online Table 2, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/
ras).
Contestation in the EU and new protectionism for the Global
North
The governmental resistance in the EU against ISDS is most notable in Germany,
largely in response to a case brought against Germany by the Swedish energy
company Vattenfall over Germany’s nuclear phase-out. This case marks a turning
point in the geopolitical landscape of ISDS. In the aftermath of the Fukushima
accident, the German Parliament decided in 2011 to amend the Atomic Energy Act
to shut down all nuclear energy facilities by 2022. Even before the Fukushima
accident, nuclear energy had been a controversial topic for the German public.
Germany’s strong anti-nuclear movement dates back to the 1970s and has pro-
foundly influenced the political scene. While the anti-nuclear moment was strong
before, on the backdrop of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the nuclear phase-out
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became mainstream in the public and political debate. Consequently, subsequent
governments prepared to leave nuclear energy behind while anti-nuclear protests
(especially opposing the final nuclear waste repository site near Gorleben) contin-
ued to shape the political landscape. In short, Germany’s nuclear phase-out has
been in the making decades before the Fukushima accident (Glaser, 2012; Jacur,
2015). When the nuclear phase-out decision was announced, almost 90% of the
population supported it (Glaser, 2012). Shortly after Germany made the decision
to compel the closure of all nuclear plants, the electricity companies with nuclear
generators – E.on, RWE and Vattenfall – sued first in the German Federal
Constitutional Court (FCC). However, the process under German law is not
expected to yield much compensation; therefore, Vattenfall, as the only foreign
company able to use international treaties, filed a parallel claim under the ECT at
the ICSID in May 2012, known as Vattenfall II vs Germany. Vattenfall demanded
e4.7 billion in compensation (over e6.1 billion including interest rates) for the loss
of its profits due to Germany’s nuclear phase-out. In other words, the ECT is being
used to seek far more generous compensation than the German justice system
would ever deliver. It should also be noted that this is the second time
Vattenfall claimed compensation from German public authorities: the first
(Vattenfall I vs Germany) was over environmental policy restrictions placed by
the city of Hamburg on a coal-fired plant. The case resulted in the reduction of
these environmental standards (Jacur, 2015).
Vattenfall II vs Germany poses a challenge to the status of the legal systems in
the Global North. The German courts are being treated in the same way as Global
North countries have treated the legal systems of the Global South. The Vattenfall
II vs Germany case became seen by the German government and the general public
as an attack on the German legal system and as undermining democratic decision-
making (Schill, 2015). Germany’s strong response to the ISDS case needs to be
understood within the context of the past decades of nuclear resistance in Germany
and strong anti-nuclear public opinion. The political contestation of anti-nuclear
resistance thus continued by entering a new realm: international legislation via
ISDS. The German government has been firm in resisting the case.
Extraordinary amounts have been spent on lawyers during this long legal battle.
By August 2020, the German government had spent e21.7 million in legal and
administrative costs (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020), and by April 2018, Vattenfall
has spent e26 million on its lawyers, which it also claims from Germany. After
almost nine years, the case is still pending, with no outcome in sight (by the time of
writing in January 2021). In 2018, Germany submitted to the ICSID tribunal that
Vattenfall could not use the ECT against Germany because of the CJEU ruling on
Achmea (see earlier). Next, the German government asked twice (in 2018 and in
2020) for the suspension of all three judges of the ICSID tribunal. All those
proposals were rejected by ICSID. Yet, Germany made it as difficult as possible
for Vattenfall.
In response to the Vattenfall case, the German government has also taken two
strategic initiatives at the EU level. First, it formulated a plan for a new
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international court system (ICS) to replace ISDS mechanisms, which has been
adopted by the EU as a central part of its reform efforts. Second, in January
2019, the EU member states (including the UK) signed a remarkable declaration
that tells courts, investors and tribunals that intra-EU claims under BITs or the
ECT should not be considered and that awards should not be enforced (European
Commission [EU], 2019). Agreement was reached in May 2020 on a plurilateral
treaty for the termination of intra-EU BITs, signed by 23 countries – including
Germany, but excluding Sweden, Finland and the UK (European Commission,
2020). This declaration has undoubtedly been influenced by the Vattenfall II vs
Germany case. Furthermore, the EU has developed a strong narrative for protect-
ing the regulatory powers of countries, as expressed by former European
Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmstrom: ‘My assessment of the traditional
ISDS system has been clear – it is not fit for purpose in the 21st century.. . . I want
to ensure fair treatment for EU investors abroad, but not at the expense of govern-
ments’ right to regulate’ (Patel, 2017: 275). Also, within the ECT, the EU is calling
for the incorporation of a ‘right to regulate’ provision, along with revising its
existing terms on expropriation (IISD, 2019b). This trend is remarkable when
considering that the EU has criticised countries in the Global South for terminat-
ing BITs and continues to negotiate FTAs, some of which include ISDS. This
shows that the politics over ISDS need to be understood as a system of post-
colonial domination, whereby Germany’s actions rest on its historical expectation
that treaties such as the ECT would be used by Germany, not against it.
This is in line with global developments towards more protectionist domestic
politics, partly driven by right-wing populist parties and politicians in the US and
elsewhere. International negotiations on FTAs have increasingly been removing or
weakening ISDS provisions, or avoiding new agreements altogether (see
Supplementary Online Table 2, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/
ras). NAFTA, which was the key reference point for modern ISDS clauses, has
been scrapped and replaced with a new treaty – the United States Mexico Canada
Agreement (USMCA) – which basically excludes ISDS. Negotiations over the
proposed EU–US trade agreement, known as TTIP, came to a standstill due to
ISDS mechanisms (Donaubauer and Nunnenkamp, 2018). The new
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) does include ISDS provisions but the US has not signed this agreement.
Furthermore, the opposition of the US government to ISDS mechanisms is affect-
ing the proposed post-Brexit UK–US trade deal (IISD, 2019a). New Zealand also
signed letters to restrict ISDS with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Peru
and Vietnam (IISD, 2018b). In June 2019, the EU reached a final agreement with
Mercosur that does not include ISDS mechanisms (European Commission, 2019).
Additionally, the agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), which entered into force on 30 May 2019, has no ISDS mechanisms in
place (African Union, 2019; IISD, 2019c). Moreover, the China–Australia Free
Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) changed the framework for ISDS procedures to
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further protect a host state’s right to regulate for legitimate public welfare objec-
tives, partly in response to Phillip Morris vs Australia (Patel, 2017).
These findings concur with scholars who have identified the growth of a new
protectionism. Trade and investment protection have become a much higher-
profile policy area for the EU, with a rising concern in the EU regarding the
competitive implications of China’s industrial policies. The EU aims to prevent
investments flowing into Europe, especially from China and Russia (European
Society of International Law [ESIL], 2019). Also, the previous Trump administra-
tion (2017–2021) pursued a more protectionist trade policy, with the US question-
ing multilateral cooperation and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Hoekman
and Puccio, 2019).
Conclusions
ISDS procedures are a powerful tool for multinational companies to obtain com-
pensation awards that both offset any commercial losses from policy decisions on
issues such as privatisation and environmental standards, and act as a deterrent to
the adoption of such policies. However, resistance to the use of ISDS has been
growing and has been increasingly successful.
This article examined the historical origins of ISDS treaties, the political resis-
tance to specific cases and the increased political opposition to ISDS systems in
general. From Cochabamba’s water wars to Germany’s resistance to Vattenfall’s
claims for compensation due to the nuclear phase-out, we see that ISDS cases are
resisted in the Global North and Global South alike: governments in the Global
South have begun to reject and terminate BITs; North American states have
scrapped NAFTA and replaced it with a treaty that is largely without ISDS;
ISDS clauses are weakened or dropped in new FTAs; and the EU and its
member states are unravelling intra-EU BITs and seeking to replace ISDS with
a more credible system.
Understanding these complex interactions requires a wider analysis of the polit-
ical economy of the system rather than just the individual cases. Drawing on our
review of events, we can identify three key dimensions of such an analysis: the
historical, post-colonial dimension; embeddedness in other political and economic
contestations, notably, over privatisation and environmental politics; and the
power of specific nation states to assert their sovereignty.
The colonial origins of legal rights for international investors are invaluable in
understanding the reaction of EU governments and the EU itself. When German
companies have themselves initiated over 60 ISDS claims against other countries,
the furious public and governmental response to the case brought by Vattenfall has
to be partly explained by the historical expectation that treaties such as the ECT
would be used by Germany, not against it. Now that Spain has been the target of
almost as many cases as a defendant as its companies have initiated elsewhere, the
treaties have unacceptably infringed on the asymmetrical status of the states that
introduced the system.
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The analysis also shows that the ISDS cases themselves are rarely the first stage
in political contestations. Many of the cases in the Global South stem from the
introduction of privatisation under conditionalities set by the World Bank and
others: where these privatisations were resisted and terminated, multinational com-
panies used international arbitration to claim compensation, and the political
resistance to the privatisations continued, though now focused on the claims.
Most cases in Western Europe originate from the success of environmental agen-
das – against nuclear power in Germany and the commitment to renewable energy
in Spain, Italy and elsewhere. The ISDS claims represent a corporate reaction to
the prospect of losing profitable business as a result of these policies. Beyond the
actual claims, threats of possible ISDS claims have been used by companies to
deter nationalisations, remunicipalisations and stricter environmental and social
regulations. In essence, ISDS is a tool in contestations over material economic
policymaking.
The resistance to ISDS mechanisms is shaped by different, contradictory and
overlapping political forces. Social movements, both nationally and international-
ly, have mobilised against ISDS in advocacy of democratic national independence,
and for rejecting the economic effects of neoliberal globalisation – as much in the
Global North (such as in Germany) as in the Global South (such as in Bolivia).
The resistance by governments of the Global South is a post-colonial phenomenon
based on rejection of colonial status and a contradictory relationship with glob-
alisation, especially as regards privatisation. The recent turn of Northern govern-
ments, however, is driven not only by social movements in the North, but also by a
post-colonial resistance to the ‘symmetrical’ use of ISDS against Global North
countries. The former European imperial countries within the institutional setting
of the EU are seeking to retain the traditional asymmetrical position of their own
companies in relation to other countries – and, at the same time, to preserve the
EU’s own status as the rule-maker for international trade, especially in the internal
market of the EU itself. Also, the US under the Trump administration (2017–2021)
was driven by populist issues of national sovereignty. If ISDS cases are brought
against COVID-19 policy measures, it seems certain that they will face great public
resistance, both from social movements’ resistance to corporate interventions, and
from state resistance to the interference with sovereignty. All these political
dynamics favour the withering away of ISDS mechanisms and investors being
redirected to national courts. The Calvo doctrine is slowly triumphing.
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